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INTRODUCTION
The Ada County Board of Commissioners in a medical indigency decision denied the
payment of services from October 10, 2017 through December 31, 2017 provided to the Patient
by Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("St. Alphonsus") under Idaho Code§ 31-3501 et

seq. The basis for the denial was that the services were not necessary as they were not the most
cost-effective services for the Patient who was ready for discharge to a facility that could provide
a lower level of care. The Board's decision was reversed on appeal by the district court, and Ada
County is appealing from the opinion of the district court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Factual Background

The Patient, C. G., was admitted to St. Alphonsus on October 7, 2017, complaining of
fatigue, weakness, heartburn, and bilateral leg pain that she thought might be MS. A.R. p. 32.
The Patient underwent multiple lab tests, x-rays, and procedures which included diagnostic
paracentesis, liver failure workup, and endoscopy. On October 10, 2017, Jacob Jones, M.D.
diagnosed acute liver failure and stated, "The patient is stable to transfer to the medical floor
without telemetry." 1 A.R. p. 74. Robert Gibson, M.D. confirmed the diagnosis of acute liver
failure secondary to alcoholic hepatitis, and made a recommendation, "continue supportive
care."2 A.R. p. 75. Following a review of the Patient's case by Boise Physical Medicine and

1

Telemetry monitoring is when healthcare providers monitor the electrical activity of your heart
for an extended time. https://www.drugs.com/cg/telemetry-monitoring.html.
2
Supportive care is defined as "interventions that help the patient achieve comfort but do not
affect the course of a disease. Called also palliative care or treatment." https://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/supportive+care, citing Miller-Keane Encyclopedia and
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Rehabilitation ("BPM and R") at St. Alphonsus on October 13, 2017, a note was entered into the
Patient's record on October 19, 2017, which reads:
Current rehabilitative recommendation is for the patient to undergo her subacute
rehabilitation at a community based skilled nursing facility. Currently, subacute
rehabilitation unit at Saint Alphonsus is able to accommodate patients who need a
short stay (7 - 10 days) for their rehabilitative needs with the anticipation of
returning directly home.
A.R. p. 108. Another note in the Patient's records dated October 19, 2017 from Andria L.
Smith, M.D. indicates, "Unfortunately, the patient is ready to go from a medical standpoint, but
we are awaiting placement." A.R. p. 110. The Patient remained inpatient at St. Alphonsus until
she was discharged home on January 12, 2018. 3

B.

Course of Proceedings

St. Alphonsus filed a third-party medical indigency application on behalf of Patient, C. G.
A.R. p. 8. The application was a 31-day emergency application for services provided to the
Patient from October 7, 2017 through November 7, 2017. St. Alphonsus filed an additional
request on December 6, 2017. A.R. p. 10. St. Alphonsus filed a second additional request on
December 31, 2017. A.R. p. 12. The additional requests were on account of continuing inpatient
care of the Patient at St. Alphonsus.
The Initial Determination on the indigency application was signed by the Board of
Commissioners on April 11, 2018, approving the dates of service from October 7, 2017 through
October 10, 2017. A separate Initial Determination issued on the same date denied the dates of
service from October 11, 201 7 through December 31, 201 7. A.R. pp .4-7. The denial of payment
for the later dates of service was based on the opinion of the Ada County Medical Advisor that
Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, and Allied Health, Seventh Edition, ©2003 by Saunders, an
imprint of Elsevier, Inc."
3 St. Alphonsus is only requesting payment for services through December 31, 2017 on its
application for medical assistance.
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those services were not "medically necessary" under the definition found at Idaho Code
§ 31-3502(18)(A)(e). A.R. p.4.
St. Alphonsus appealed the Board's Initial Determination of denial.

The scheduled

hearing on the appeal was continued on several occasions awaiting a decision from the Idaho
Supreme Court on the very question of subacute care in In Re: Med. Indigency Application of
C.H, 164 Idaho 801, 435 P.3d 1121 (2019). 4 Finally, on April 24, 2019, the Board issued its
Final Determination, which was to uphold the denial as to the dates of service from October 11,
201 7 through December 31, 201 7.
St. Alphonsus filed a timely petition for judicial review with the district court. The
district court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019. On February 3, 2020, the district court
issued its opinion, reversing the decision of the Board. Ada County on behalf of the Board of
Commissioners filed a timely appeal to this Court.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the "most cost-effective service" must
be currently available to an indigent patient to be deemed a "necessary medical service" under
Idaho Code§ 31-3502(18)(A)(e).
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that the services were medically necessary
under Idaho Code §3 l-3502(18)(A)(e) when alternate rehabilitation facilities existed -- even at
St. Alphonsus Rehabilitation -- to provide a lower level of needed services at a subacute care
billing rate.
4

This Court vacated the board of commissioners' amended determination because the board did
not address the "partial denial of benefits and because there [were no] findings of fact or
conclusions of law setting forth the basis for the [partial] denial [of benefits]." In Re: Med.
Indigency Application of C.H, 164 Idaho at 802, 435 P.3d at 1122. The case was remanded to
the Gem County Board of Commissioners.
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3. Whether the "most cost-effective service" under the statute is only that service from a
provider that can offer the designated service at a lesser cost and that will be willing to accept an
indigent patient.
4. Whether the district court misread St. Joseph Reg'/ Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty.
Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000) and misinterpreted Idaho Code§ 31-3502(18)(A)(e)

to support its conclusion that only those services financially available to a patient are to be
considered for purposes of determining which services are "most-effective services" to qualify as
"medically necessary."
5. Whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the
services provided by St. Alphonsus were not "necessary medical services" under Idaho Code
§ 31-3502(18)(A)(e).
6. Whether Appellant, Ada County, is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A county's denial of an application for medical indigency benefits is reviewed under the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (AP A). Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Ada County, Bd. of Comm 'rs
of Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 229, 192 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2008); Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v.
Kootenai County Comm 'rs, 136 Idaho 787, 790, 41 P.3d 215, 218 (2001). "[J]udicial review of

disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial review as defined in
this chapter." Idaho Code§ 67-5277. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the administrative agency on questions of fact. Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495, 903
P.2d 84 (1995). On issues of law and statutory interpretation, an appellate court freely reviews
the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. See St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd.
v. Bd. of Comm 'rs ofAda County, 147 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009).
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This Court has previously held that the Board's decision is analogous to an agency's
decision. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 51,
53, 190 P.3d 870, 872 (2008). "This court independently reviews the agency decision. We give
serious consideration to the district court's decision, but review the matter as if the case were
directly appealed from the agency." Id. quoting Bonner General Hosp. v. Bonner County, 133
Idaho 7, 9, 981 P.2d 242, 244. "Determining the meaning of a statute is a matter oflaw." Id.,

quoting E. Idaho Reg'/ Med. Ctr. v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 139 Idaho 882, 884, 88 P.3d
701, 703 (2004).
According to Idaho Code §67-5279(3),
The court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are (a) in violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made
upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT
The Ada County Medical Advisor concluded that the medical services were not necessary
as they were not the most cost-effective services under Idaho Code § 31-3502(18)(A)(e) and
stated:
The patient was clearly ready for a transfer to a subacute rehabilitation on
10/10[17] but had no funding.
A.R. p.25. Relying on the Ada County Medical Advisor's opinion, the Board denied the dates of
service from October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017.
The crux of this appeal is whether the services provided to the Patient by St. Alphonsus
from October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017 were medically necessary services subject to
payment by the County.

The section of the statute defining "necessary medical services"

relevant to this appeal is section (e), which provides that necessary medical services:
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Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or supplies, and at
least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results for the
person's illness, injury or disease.
Idaho Code § 31-3502(18)(A). The Patient was ready for discharge to rehabilitation as was
repeatedly noted in the medical records beginning on October 13, 2017, such that it is clear that
services at the level afforded by St. Alphonsus were not actually required.

Rather, the

"necessary medical services" were rehab services that could have been provided at a lower cost
at a facility other than St. Alphonsus. In other words, the services provided by St. Alphonsus
were not "necessary medical services" under the statute and, therefore, not subject to approval
for payment by the Board.

A.
The district court erred in holding that "the most cost-effective service[]"
must be currently available to an indigent patient to be deemed a "necessary medical
service" under Idaho Code§ 31-3502(18)(A)(e).
The district court determined in error that no alternative services were available to the
Patient in that no facility was willing to accept the patient without a means of payment.
However, there did exist options for the Patient to proceed to rehabilitation at a facility other
than St. Alphonsus, but for the Patient's lack of funding.

The district court focused on the

hospital's inability to transfer the Patient to a rehabilitation facility because the Patient had no
insurance and no resources to pay. Thus, the district court injected "availability" of the Patient's
resources to access the services into the analysis of "most cost-effective services." The district
court separated out the fact that rehabilitation services were accessible in the community from
whether the rehabilitation services were services that the patient could afford. Unreasonably, the
district court then interpreted the acute care services that were provided as "necessary medical
services."
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If the meaning of a statute is clear, the Court reads the statute literally, neither adding nor

taking away anything by judicial construction. St. Benedict's Hosp. v. Twin Falls County, 107
Idaho 143, 686 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1984). The language of the statute that defines "necessary
medical services" does not implicate the financial availability of services to an individual patient
based on his/her ability to pay. The services provided by St. Alphonsus should not be deemed
"necessary medical services" until an appropriate lower level facility can be found which will
accept the patient. This is an impermissible construction of the statute.
There is no wording in section (e) of the statute that limits the "most cost-effective
services" to services that the Patient can afford to pay for. "If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.2d 502, 506 (2011), quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho
360, 362, 9 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). The services provided by St. Alphonsus from October 11,
2017 through December 31, 2017 are not "necessary medical services" in that they could have
been provided at a lower cost in a subacute setting.
B.
The district court erred in holding that the services were medically necessary
when alternate rehab facilities at St. Alphonsus Rehabilitation existed to provide the lower
level of care required at a subacute care billed rate.

The district court in evaluating the availability of services looked not only to the Patient's
lack of funding but noted that the Patient had been turned down even by St. Alphonsus inpatient
rehab, as her length of stay would be too long. D. Ct. Opinion at page 8. This rationale was not
expressly related to whether the patient could pay for the rehabilitation charges. The district
court gave little weight to the existence of inpatient rehab services at St. Alphonsus that we can
readily assume cost less than the rate for full, acute care hospital services that were provided to
the Patient. The court concluded that the services provided by St. Alphonsus were "necessary
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medical services" as they were the only services available to the Patient, which is factually not
the case. As to St. Alphonsus inpatient rehab, which clearly existed and was available, the
availability issue was not one of cost but rather turned on the expected duration of the Patient's
rehab that was at odds with St. Alphonsus inpatient rehab policy objectives to only service
patients for seven to ten days before discharge home. A.R. p.108. The County, however, is not
obligated to provide compensation to the applicant hospital when its own rehab unit's policies
stand in the way of transferring the Patient to a lower cost level of care. It was error for the
district court to find the services provided by St. Alphonsus to be "necessary medical services."
C.
"The most cost-effective services" are not only those services that can be
provided at a lower cost and by a provider willing to accept an indigent patient.
In ruling as it did, the district court effectively imposed a two-step analysis into the
interpretation of "the most cost-effective services" to (1) require that there in fact be alternative
services that can offer the Patient needed care and (2) that the alternative services be within the
Patient's ability to pay. The failure of either one would then mean that the services that the
applicant hospital provided are by default "necessary medical services."
In construing a statute, a court is to examine the language used, the reasonableness of the
proposed interpretation, and the policy behind the statute. Idaho v. Hagerman Water Right
Owners, Inc. (In re SRBA), 130 Idaho 727, 733, 947 P.2d 400, 406 (1997).

The statute in

question does contain two parts to the definition of "necessary medical services," but not in line
with the district court's thinking. First, the services must be the most cost-effective and second,
they must be at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic results for the person's illness,
injury or disease. While the second part involves consideration of the projected outcome to the
patient, the first part looks only to the relative cost of the services, detached from any individual
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patient. The cost of service is the cost, unaffected by an individual's ability to pay; and to view
it otherwise is unreasonable and wrong.
According to the record, the physician notes recommended rehab that could be provided
in a skilled nursing facility. There is no evidence in the record identifying facilities, including
skilled nursing facilities, that were contacted by St. Alphonsus and which refused to accept the
Patient; but the record suggests that the hospital made those inquiries and was rebuffed.
Interestingly, care provided in skilled nursing facilities is spelled out as services that are not
included as "necessary medical services." Idaho Code § 31-3502(1 S)(B)(d). Had the Patient
been transferred to a skilled nursing facility to receive the prescribed care, those costs would not
have been compensable under the medical indigency statutes.
The policy of the indigency statutes is that the county is to be the payor of last resort,
Idaho Code§ 31-3501(2), and payment is restricted to medically necessary services. Idaho Code
§ 31-3502(18)(A). For St. Alphonsus to keep the Patient inpatient for services that could have
been provided in an in-patient rehabilitation facility or in a skilled nursing facility does not
convert the services provided by St. Alphonsus to "necessary medical services." St. Alphonsus
is not entitled to compensation for its services subsequent to the recommended date of discharge
because a rehab facility was capable of providing the care needed by the Patient at a lower cost
than St. Alphonsus billed charges.

The services provided by St. Alphonsus were not necessary

medical services.
D.
The district court misread the St. Joseph case to support its conclusion that
only services financially available to a patient are to be considered for purposes of
determining which services are "the most cost-effective services" to qualify as "necessary
medical services."

The statute under examination in St. Joseph was Idaho Code § 31-3502(17), which
contains the definition of the term "medically indigent." The Court in St. Joseph overturned the
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county board's denial of the hospital's application for medical indigent benefits based on the
board's conclusions that the patient was not medically indigent and that the services provided
were not medically necessary. Recapping the St. Joseph case:
The county board denied the individual's application based upon affirmative
findings that there were other resources available to provide the same services to
the applicant at lesser cost, mentioning by name the state-supported mental health
services at the state psychiatric hospital, and alcohol treatment facilities at local
inpatient rehabilitation centers. [St.Joseph Reg'/ Med. Ctr v.Nez Perce Cnty.
Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 489, 5 P.3d 466, 469 (2000).] However, there was no
evidence before the board that any of the alternative providers actually provided
the services required in the case. Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. It turned out that some
of the providers did not provide services in the subject area at all, or were not
providing services to individuals who were psychotic, and the state hospital
admittance procedures made direct referral there not available. Id. Under the
facts, there would not have been any other medical provider other than St.
Joseph's in the Nez Perce area providing short-term psychiatric intervention to a
psychotic patient admitted through the emergency room.
Mem. Decision at 7, St. Luke's Health Sys., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Gem County, No. CV2017-145 (Idaho 3rd Jud. Dist. Ct. February 14, 2020) (Attached as Appendix A hereto). "In the
St. Joseph's case, cost or inability to pay on the part of the specific patient was not a factor in the

issue of availability." Id. Therefore, St. Joseph's does not authorize the insertion of availability
based on financial resources into the determination of medical necessity.
In the case before the Court, St. Alphonsus admitted the Patient and provided necessary
medical services from October 7, 2017 through October 10, 2017, which services were approved
by the County. In order to approve those services for payment, there was a finding by the Board
that the Patient was medically indigent. As to the denied portion of the application for services
from October 10 to December 31, 2017, the district court sought to revisit the question of the
Patient's indigency in relation to the issue of medical necessity under Idaho Code § 313502( 18)(A)( e). There is no question but that the Patient was indigent and in that context, "if
ability to pay is a consideration in the availability of alternate providers, that aspect will, in most
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cases, swallow consideration of every other element that is supposed to be measured and the
actual issue of which is the most cost-effective service will disappear." Id. at page 11.
We must construe a statute to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ada County Bd.
of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc. 141 Idaho 202, 207, 108 P.3d 349 354 (2005).

When

construing a statute, this Court "will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will
ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature based on the whole act and
every work therein, lending substance and meaning to the whole provision."

Ada County

Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993). The
relevant inquiry in deciding on approval or denial of a medical indigency application includes a
finding on each of five elements: that the patient is a resident of the State of Idaho, that Ada
County is the obligated county, that the application was timely filed, that the services were
medically necessary, and that patient is medically indigent for those services listed on the
application. The evidence required to prove that the patient does not have sufficient resources to
pay for the care and treatment is not the same evidence needed to prove that the services are
"necessary medical services." The latter requires the admission of expert testimony based upon
a review of the medical records. Here, the expert testimony from the Medical Advisor was not
only uncontroverted but also expressed in terms related to the statutory definition that the
services were not the most cost-effective services able to yield virtually the same results.
The intent of the legislature is for a county to pay only for necessary medical services
provided to an indigent patient. Having found the patient to be indigent, the analysis of whether
the services were "necessary medical services" was to follow.

The finding of indigency,

however, is to have no bearing on the finding of medical necessity; and only if each statutory
element is met must the application for payment be approved. The Board in this case acted in a
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manner consistent with the statutes in denying payment for the acute care provided to this Patient
by St. Alphonsus when subacute care was a clear, comparable alternative.

E.
There was substantial evidence for the Board to conclude that the services
provided were not medically necessary services.
As the Medical Advisor's opinion informed the Board, the services needed by this Patient
after October 10, 2017 were not required to be provided at St. Alphonsus in the acute care
setting. The necessary services could have been provided in a subacute setting, although the
Patient remained inpatient at St. Alphonsus until sometime in January 2018.
The Court may take judicial notice of the many rehabilitation facilities in the community,
any of which existed where the Patient could have been rendered the care she needed, as
repeatedly outlined by the treating physicians beginning on October 10, 2017. Even though no
comparative billing from a rehab facility is contained in the record, it is safe to assume that
subacute care is less costly than acute care.
The "most cost-effective" service is to be determined by a neutral comparison of the
stated costs for the same treatment in an alternative treatment facility and not impacted by the
resources a particular patient has to pay those costs. In healthcare, a cost-effectiveness analysis
is a way to examine both the costs and health outcomes of one or more interventions.

It

compares an intervention to another intervention (or the status quo) by estimating how much it
costs to gain a unit of health outcome. See www.cdc.gov/policy/polaris/economics/costeffectiveness.html. Thus, the acute care provided by St. Alphonsus to this Patient fails to qualify
as "the most cost-effective" and therefore is not a "medically necessary service" under Idaho
Code § 31-3502(18) A.
The Board was authorized to rely upon the opinion of the Medical Advisor that the
services for which St. Alphonsus seeks compensation could have been provided at a lower level
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of care in terms of cost to the County. This was the only evidence on the issue of medical
necessity, leading the Board to correctly conclude that the services provided by St. Alphonsus
were not "medically necessary services."

F.

Ada County requests an award of attorney fees and costs.

Ada County asserts that it is entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7 in
that St. Alphonsus is defending this appeal without a basis in fact or law. If the Court finds Ada
County to be the prevailing party in this appeal, the County respectfully requests that the Court
award the County its reasonable cost and fees.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2020.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:
Deputy Prosecuting Attome

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2020, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following person(s) by the following
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Bryan A. Nickels
Scanlan Griffiths Aldridge + Nickels
401 W. Front Street, Suite 307
Boise, ID 83702

_ _ Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Certified Mail
_x~ E-serve: ban@sganlaw.com

Isl Chyvonne Tiedemann
Chyvonne Tiedemann
Legal Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

St. Luke's Health System, Ltd.
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. CV-2017-145

V.

Board of Commissioners of Gem County

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant/Respondent.

This matter is before the court on administrative review from a decision by the board of
commissioners of Gem County denying part of an indigent services claim under Idaho Code §
31-3501, et. seq. The appellant is St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. which appears by counsel,
Mark C. Peterson, of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Boise. The respondents are the board of
commissioners of Gem County, who appear by counsel, deputy prosecuting attorney Tahja L.
Jensen, Office of the Gem County Prosecuting Attorney, Emmett. The matter was fully briefed
and argued to the Hon. D. Duff McKee, senior judge, on Thursday, January 30, 2020, in
courtrooms of the Third Judicial District's Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell. The matter
having been duly submitted, the court now renders the following decision:
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For reasons stated, the decision of the board of commissioners of Gem County is
affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History
This is the second trip into the arena of judicial review on this claim. The facts appear
undisputed. The patient, acknowledged to be indigent and eligible for indigent services, with
Gem County being the obligated county, was admitted to St. Luke's hospital in Meridian through
the emergency room on January 26, 2016, after being found unconscious. The patient was
diagnosed as suffering from meningitis, seizures, and severe brain lesions.
By February 19, 2016, the patient had recovered from the acute stages ofher condition.
While she still required inpatient medical care, she did not require the level of hospital care
provided by St. Luke's. She could have been maintained in her continuing convalescence by a
lower level medical facility. However, St. Luke's was not able to locate a lower level medical
facility that was willing to accept the patient until March 9, 2016. Consequently, St. Luke's
continued to provide medical services to the patient between February 19, 2016, and March 9,
2016, at its hospital in Meridian. On March 9, 2016, St. Luke's discharged the patient to a lower
level medical facility-Life Care Center of Treasure Valley-for rehabilitative and convalescent

care.
St. Luke's applied to Gem County for medical indigency benefits covering the period
from January 26, 2016, through March 9, 2016, the date the patient was discharged to Life Care
Center of Treasure Valley. The county allowed reimbursement for services at the statutory rate
from the date of admission through February 18, 2016. The hospital's claim for services after
February 19, 2016, was denied.
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The medical expert retained by the county provided an opinion that hospital services at
the level provided by St Luke's were not required in this case after February 19, 2016. Based on
this opinion, the board determined that the services provided by St. Luke's after the date
indicated were not medically necessary. St. Luke's does not dispute the expert's opinion, but
contends that it was unable to locate a lower level medical facility that was willing to admit the
patient until March 9, 2016, and therefore it disputes the county's determination that hospital
services were not medically necessary.
St. Luke's filed a petition for judicial review to the district court, which affirmed the
board's decision. St. Luke's appealed and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. It vacated the
board of commissioner's amended determination because the board did not address the ''partial
denial of benefits and because there [were no] findings of fact or conclusions of law setting forth
the basis for the (partial] denial [of benefits]." In re: Med. lndigency Application of CH, 164
Idaho 801,802,435 P.3d 1121, I 122 (2019). The case was remanded to the board of
commissioners.

On June 17, 2019, the board of commissioners issued a new set of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The board again denied compensation to St. Luke's for medical services
provided to the patient between February 19, 2016, and March 9, 2016. The board noted in its
new findings of fact that their medical expert "found that the inpatient stay from 02/19/20 I 6 to
03/09/2016 was rehabilitative in nature and not medically necessary per Idaho Code§ 313502(18)A(e) (and§ 31-3502(18)]B(d)." AR at 473. The board included the following language
in its conclusions of law:

Conclusion: The patient was medically ready for discharge as of 02/19/2016. The
medical opinion of [the medical expert] is that dates of service 02/19/2016 to
03/09/2016 were not necessary medical services as defined in the statute. There
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was no contrary evidence presented and St. Luke's argument does not contradict
the medical evidence.

Finding: The Board of County Commissioners determined that dates of service
01/26/2016 to 02/18/2016 were necessary medical services. The Board of County
Commissioners determined that dates of service 2/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were
not necessary medical services.
AR at 474.
St. Luke's again returned to district court and filed a timely petition for administrative
review.

Issue Presented
Both parties state the problem in different ways, but the central issue is whether or not
financial inability to pay affects the question of availability as that phrase is used in the definition
of "necessary medical services" in the statute. To state the issue in the alternative:

If an indigent patient requires some degree of service, but not to the degree
provided by the hospital, and a provider of an appropriate level of service exists
but will not accept the patient because of the patient's inability to pay, is the
hospital service still a "medically necessary service" until an appropriate lower
level facility can be found which will accept the patient?
From the county's perspective, the issue might be stated:
Once an indigent patient reaches the stage of recovery where the level of service
provided by the hospital is no longer medically necessary, and where alternate
facilities are available to provide the lesser degree of service required, may the
county be required to continue to pay for hospital service under the indigency
statute if the hospital is unable to locate an appropriate lower level provider
willing to accept the patient because of her inability to pay?
Under either question, the issue turns on whether the existence of available resources, as
used in the statutes, includes business considerations of willingness to accept indigent patients.

Standard of Review
Judicial review of a county's determination for indigent assistance is provided by I.C. §
3 l-3505G, which makes the issue subject to the provisions of the Idaho Administrative

Memorandum Decision

Page - 4

APPENDIX A

Procedures Act, as contained in Title 67, Chapter 52, of the Idaho Code. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr.

v. Kootenai Cty. Comm 'rs., 136 Idaho 787, 790, 41 P.3d 215,218 (2001). The reviewing court is
constrained not to substitute its judgment for that of the county commissioners in the
administration of the act, but to intercede only where it finds that the decision under examination
is (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority
of the agency; ( c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. l.C. § 67-5279(3);

see also Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. ofCty. Comm 'rs ofAda Cty., 146 Idaho 51,
53, 190 P.3d 870, 872 (2008).

Analysis
There is no dispute here that medical services at some level were necessary after
February 19, 2016; the patient was still on IVs and required inpatient medical care for her
convalescence. She could not humanely be turned out to the street. But she did not require
services at the level afforded by St. Luke's full-service hospital in Meridian, and the hospital did
not have facilities for providing the lesser convalescent care actually required.
Under the law, the county is obligated to pay for "necessary medical services" of an
indigent upon timely application by the hospital. The phrase "necessary medical services" is
defined in the code at LC. § 3 l-3502(18)A, which contains a number of provisions. Boiled down
to the relevant inquiry, there is no argument that the services provided by St. Luke's met all the
requirements of this statute, with the exception of subpart (e), which provides as follows:
"Necessary medical services" means health care services and supplies that ... are
the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or supplies, and at least as
likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results for the person's
illness, injury, or disease.
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The county's interpretation of this section of the statute is that where there is an
alternative provider that meets all of the other criteria of the statute at a lower cost, then the
service provided by the hospital is no longer a "necessary medical service" under the statute. The
county observes that the statute does not require that the alternative provider actually accept the
patient, nor does it require the county to seek out and arrange for alternative services if such
exist. The language appears in the definition of "necessary medical services," meaning that
where the condition stated exists, i.e., the existence of a facility that offers the designated service
at a lesser cost for the same therapeutic result, then as to the applying hospital, its services are
not Hnecessary medical services." If the service is not covered by the statute, the county is not
obligated to provide compensation to the applicant hospital.
St. Luke's argues that this section of the code must be interpreted to mean a comparison
among alternative services that are actually available to the patient, meaning willing to accept the
patient into care. Since a facility willing to accept the patient could not be found because the
patient could not afford to pay, St. Luke's argues that there was no other Hcost effective service"
other than the full hospital service that was actually provided.
The county, on the other hand, points to their expert who reported that full hospital
service was not the most cost effective, as the patient did not require full hospital care; the care
she did require could be provided at a lesser cost elsewhere. The expert did not identify any
particular alternate facility, nor report on the actual financial details of a transfer. As the county
points out, this is not a requirement of the statute, nor is it the responsibility of the county to find
and determine the specific availability of alternative resources for any given case.
St. Luke's argues that St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County

Commissioners, 134 Idaho 486,490, 5 P.3d 466,470 (2000), where the Supreme Court reversed
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a county denial and ruled that "only those resources actually available to an applicant can be
considered for purposes of eligibility for medical indigency benefits," supports its argument.
However, the statute under examination there was J.C. § 31-3502(17), which is the
definition of the term "medically indigent." In the St. Joseph's case, the patient presented to the
emergency room seeking treatment for alcoholism. 134 Idaho at 487, 5 P.3d at 467. She
appeared to be psychotic and was admitted for psychiatric treatment. Id. She remained in the
mental ward for 10 days, for which the hospital eventually sought reimbursement. Id. The board
denied the application upon the grounds that she was not "medically indigent" under § 313502(17) in that there was no emergency, treatment for alcoholism was not a medical necessity,
and other facilities were better equipped to handle her problems. Id. at 488, 5 P.3d at 468.
However, none of the other facilities were equipped to handle psychotic patients-which the
applicant appeared to be-and there was unrebutted testimony that her psychotic condition did
amount to an emergency. Id. at 489-90, 5 P.3d at 469-70.
The county board denied the individual's application based upon affirmative findings that
there were other resources available to provide the same services to the applicant at lesser cost,
mentioning by name the state-supported mental health services at the state psychiatric hospitals,
and alcohol treatment facilities at local inpatient rehabilitation centers. Id. at 489, 5 P.3d at 469.
However, there was no evidence before the board that any of the alternative providers actually
provided the services required in the case. Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. It turned out that some of the
providers did not provide services in the subject area at all, or were not providing services to
individuals who were psychotic, and the state hospital admittance procedures made direct
referral there not available. Id. Under the facts, there would not have been any other medical
provider other than St. Joseph's in the Nez Perce area providing short-term psychiatric
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intervention to a psychotic patient admitted through the emergency room. In the St. Joseph 's
case, cost or inability to pay on the part of the specific patient was not a factor in the issue of
availability.
In the instant case, the hospital admitted the patient and provided medically necessary
treatment for some period of time. There was no issue of medical indigency, or qualification for
reimbursement. The issue was for how long the initial treatment was to be provided, and where
and by whom was the after-care to be managed. Here, there were other, available providers
suitable to take over the convalescent care once she was stabilized. According to the facts of this
case, the only reason the hospital could not relocate the patient was not for unavailability of other
providers or of appropriate alternative services, it was because the alternative providers would
not accept her transfer without assurance of payment.
In the first appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of availability of
providers, the issue ofrelative cost, or the question of whether the ability to pay was a
consideration in the question of the availability of alternative services at all. Rather, in the first
appeal, the Court held that the commissioners failed to show why benefits were denied from
February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Re: Med. JndigencyApplication of C.H., 164 Idaho
at 804, 435 P.3d at 1124.
On remand, the commissioner's fixed what they were told to fix. The board's new
findings of fact and conclusions of law after remand are brief. The relevant findings are numbers
8 and 9, which read:

8. The County received an amended utilization management review from [the
medical expert] on October 24, 2016 which read:
a. 01/26/2016 to 02/12/2016 ED/inpatient stay at SLMMC is considered medically
necessary and emergent. The additional clinical notes indicate the patient was
medically stable on 02/12 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an
acute care inpatient hospital. Her medical care was at a maintenance level, and her
Memorandum Decision
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needs were rehabilitative in nature. The inpatient stay from 02/12/2016 to
03/09/2016 is considered not medically necessary for purposes of payment IC 31 ..
3502(18)A(e) [and§ 31-3502(18)]B(d)[.]
b. Home health services are considered not medically necessary for purposes of
payment. The services to be provided appear directed towards maintenance rather
than treatment[.]
9. On November 16, 2016, after receiving additional medical records, [the medical
expert] again amended his utilization management review, finding that ''the
additional clinical notes indicate the patient was medically stable on 02/19 and it
appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care inpatient hospital." AR
at 38. [The medical expert] found that the inpatient stay from 02/19/2016 to
03/09/2016 was rehabilitative in nature and not medically necessary per Idaho
Code§ 31-3502(18)A(e) [and§ 3l-3502(18)]B(d). 1
The board's findings are sparse, but they contain the minimum information needed to
render a determination. The board's findings tracked the language of the statute and included a
concise and explicit statement pertaining to the underlying facts. Furthermore, the board's order
explicitly stated that compensation for the period from February 19, 2016, through March 9,
2016, was denied because the services provided by St. Luke's to the patient were not "necessary
medical expenses," which was the conclusion of the county's medical expert. Thus, the board
satisfied the requirements set forth in I.C. § 67-5248(1) and, as directed by the Supreme Court,
connected the findings of fact to the relevant provisions of the statute. The board's determination
was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
While the findings of fact and conclusions of law did not address whether a lower cost
facility was willing to accept the patient between February 19, 2016, and March 9, 2016, the
Supreme Court did not mandate an analysis of this issue on remand. Nothing in the statute
requires the county to investigate or determine for itself the specific availability of alternative
1

I. C. § 31-3 502{ 18}B(d} provides that the definition of" necessary medical services'' shal1 not include
"[ s ]ervices related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing, assisted living, and/or shelter care
facilities."
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services to a specific patient. Rather, the burden is on the patient or applicant to show all
elements of eligibility, including the absence of appropriate alternative providers or services
where that is an issue.
In this case, the inference was that suitable facilities did exist, for St. Luke's itself
acknowledged this in reporting that it was unable to get one of these facilities to accept the
patient without a financial guarantee. Further, St. Luke's also demonstrated that the problem
could be solved without county assistance because the hospital solved it.
The circumstances in this case present a difficult catch-22 to both the hospital and the
county. The alternate provider exists, but will not accept the patient without assurance of
payment. The patient's financial resources are unknown, other than she qualified for county
assistance for the hospital service. But qualification is on an individual basis, and would have
required a separate application through the new provider. The issue can quickly get complicated
if the convalescent services would not be covered for reimbursement under 1.C. § 31-3502(18)8,
for example. Can the hospital be reimbursed at the hospital level of service when what is
required is only skilled nursing care-which the patient cannot afford to pay for and which does
not independently qualify for indigent assistance as skilled nursing care is specifically excluded
from the definition of medically necessary service under the statute? If financial ability to pay is
included in the consideration of what constitutes cost effective service, the definition is left
standing on its head. On the example above, a loophole might be created where unqualified
service can be reimbursed by the expedient of admission through the emergency room and the
subsequent inability to transfer the patient out to a lower level facility.
Since the entire area of concern is indigent services, if specific ability to pay is a
consideration in the availability of alternate providers, that aspect will, in most cases, swallow
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consideration of every other element that is supposed to be measured and the actual issue of
which is the most cost-effective service will disappear.
The statute declares, in essence, that the county may not pay for the services unless they
are medically necessary, and if another facility is available that can provide the needed care at a
lower cost then, by definition, the services of the higher cost provider are not medically
necessary. While the St. Joseph's case teaches that the other facilities must actually exist in the
area reasonably accessible to the patient, and must actually have available the services or

sequence of services needed, there is nothing in the statute, or in the St. Joseph 's case construing
the statute, that requires the county to demonstrate that an alternate facility is available that will
actually and unconditionally accept the patient.
In the court's view, this makes the issue at its foundation a policy determination by the
county. The collection of statutes makes it clear that the county is to be the last resort. If there are
any other means of providing for the care of the patient, the other means must be exhausted first.

It is not for the county to search out the other means; it is for the applicant to show that the other
means either do not exist or have been exhausted.
In the evaluation of alternative providers, the statute is not clear whether financial
considerations are to be taken into consideration. 2 The St. Joseph 's case does not reach the
question. It then becomes a matter of statutory interpretation. "Where an agency interprets a
statute or rule, [ courts apply] a four-pronged test to detennine the appropriate level of deference
to the agency['s) interpretation." Duncan v. State Bd. ofAccountancy, 149 Idaho I, 3, 232 P.3d
322, 324 (2010). More specifically, courts "must detennine whether: (1) the agency is
responsible for administration of the rule in issue; (2) the agency's construction is reasonable; (3)
2

The hospital supplied the court with a copy of a recent district court decision from another district, in
which the court there concluded that ability to pay had to be considered in the determination of available
alternatives. With due respect to my able colleague, I disagree with his analysis.

Memorandum Decision

Page - 1 I

APPENDIX A

the language of the rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue; and (4) any of the rationales
underlying the rule of agency deference are present." Id. One of the rationales underlying the
rule of agency deference is whether "a practical interpretation of the rule exists .... " / d. Here,
the board of commissioners is responsible for administering Idaho Code§ 31-3501, et. seq.
within Gem County; the county's construction of the statute is reasonable; the language in the
statute is not clear as to whether financial considerations are to be taken into consideration; and,
the county has articulated a practical interpretation of the rule. Thus, the county's interpretation
of the statute is entitled to deference.
It is a policy determination for the county to decide that the financial circumstances of a

particular patient are not relevant to the consideration of the most cost-effective services and
whether alternative providers are available. This court concludes that the county was correct in
its determination that the issue of availability of alternative providers includes only the
determination that such facilities actually exist, have beds or openings available, and do provide
the appropriate level of care necessary to the patient's situation. The issue does not include the
specific issue of non-acceptance of the patient based upon financial considerations.
This may create hard-edged lines, but by the very existence of the statutory definitions,
and the statutory mandate that benefits are not to be paid unless the qualification standards are
met, hard lines must be drawn. The county's determination is within its discretion and
administrative responsibility. The harshness of the result is for the legislature. It is not a solution
for the court to interfere with the management decisions of the county and re-write the statute.
The findings and conclusions provided in this case met the standards required of the
commissioners by the terms of the remand in In re: Med. Indigency Application of C.H., supra.
The result is based upon the undisputed evidence in the record and the opinions of the county's
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medical expert. It is not arbitrary or without foundation. There is no need for further judicial
intervention. The decision of the county commissioners should be affirmed.

Attorney Fees
The hospital requested attorney fees, but is not the prevailing party. The county did not
request fees. It is entitled to its costs, but no attorney fees are awarded.

Conclusion
For reasons stated, the decision of the board of commissioners of Gem County in denying
reimbursement for services in the subject case after February 19, 2016, upon the findings and
conclusions added to the case in response to the Supreme Court remand, is affirmed. Costs are
awarded to the county.
Dated this

J1

day of February, 2020.

~ ~ ..,

Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee
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